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Abstract
As a field of AI, Machine Reasoning (MR) uses largely symbolic means to formalize and em-
ulate abstract reasoning. Studies in early MR have notably started inquiries into Explainable AI
(XAI) – arguably one of the biggest concerns today for the AI community. Work on explainable
MR as well as on MR approaches to explainability in other areas of AI has continued ever since. It
is especially potent in modern MR branches, such as argumentation, constraint and logic program-
ming, planning. We hereby aim to provide a selective overview of MR explainability techniques
and studies in hopes that insights from this long track of research will complement well the current
XAI landscape. This document reports our work in-progress on MR explainability.
1 Introduction
Machine Reasoning (MR) is a field of AI that complements the field of Machine Learning (ML)
by aiming to computationally mimic abstract thinking. This is done by way of uniting known (yet
possibly incomplete) information with background knowledge and making inferences regarding un-
known or uncertain information. MR has outgrown Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR,
see e.g. [27]) and now encompasses various symbolic and hybrid AI approaches to automated rea-
soning. Central to MR are two components: a knowledge base (see e.g. [61]; common in Axiom
Pinpointing, Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) and Proof Assistants, Non-classical Logic-Based
Reasoning (Logic Programming), Argumentation) or a model of the problem (see e.g. [89]; com-
mon in Constraint Programming (CP), Planning, Decision Theory, Reinforcement Learning), which
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formally represents knowledge and relationships among problem components in symbolic, machine-
processable form; and a general-purpose inference engine or solving mechanism, which allows to
manipulate those symbols and perform semantic reasoning.1
The field of Explainable AI (XAI, see e.g. [1, 13, 20, 54, 130, 146, 149, 155, 169, 177, 196])
encompasses endeavors to make AI systems intelligible to their users, be they humans or machines.
XAI comprises research in AI as well as interdisciplinary research at the intersections of AI and
subjects ranging from Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), see e.g. [149], to social sciences, see e.g.
[33, 144]. Explainability of AI is often seen as a crucial driver for the real-world deployment of
trustworthy modern AI systems.
According to e.g. Hansen and Rieger in [100], explainability was one of the main distinctions
between the 1st (dominated by KR and rule-based systems) and the 2nd (expert systems and statis-
tical learning) waves of AI, with expert systems addressing the problems of explainability and ML
approaches treated as black boxes. With the ongoing 3rd wave of AI, ML explainability has received
a great surge of interest [13, 54, 149]. By contrast therefore, it seems that a revived interest in MR
explainability is only just picking up pace (e.g. ECAI 2020 Spotlight tutorial on Argumentative Ex-
planations in AI2 and KR 2020 Workshop on Explainable Logic-Based Knowledge Representation3).
However, explainability in MR dates over four decades, see e.g. [100, 110, 151, 155, 196]. Explain-
ability in MR can be roughly outlined thus.
1st generation expert systems provide only so-called (reasoning) trace explanations, showing in-
ference rules that led to a decision. A major problem with trace explanations is the lack of “informa-
tion with respect to the system’s general goals and resolution strategy”[151, p. 174]. 2nd generation
expert systems instead provide so-called strategic explanations, revealing “why information is gath-
ered in a certain order, why one knowledge piece is invoked before others and how reasoning steps
contribute to high-level goals”[151, p. 174]. Going further, so-called deep explanations separating the
domain model from the structural knowledge have been sought, where “the system has to try to figure
out what the user knows or doesn’t know, and try to answer the question taking that into account.”[204,
p. 73] Progress in MR explainability notwithstanding, it can been argued (see e.g. [137, 151, 169])
that to date, explainability in MR particularly and perhaps in AI at large is still insufficient in aspects
such as justification, criticism, and cooperation. These aspects, among others, are of concern in the
modern MR explainability scene (around year 2000 onwards), whereby novel approaches to explain-
ability in various branches of MR have been making appearances. We review some of them here and
spell out the explainability questions addressed therein.
1See, however, e.g. [25] for an alternative view of MR stemming from a sub-symbolic/connectionist perspective.
2https://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/ afr114/ecaitutorial/
3https://lat.inf.tu-dresden.de/XLoKR20/
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1.1 Motivation
The following summarizes our motivations and assumptions in this work.
1. We appreciate that MR is not yet a commonplace AI term, unlike e.g. ML or KR. We recognize
that MR has evolved from KR and comprises other, mostly symbolic, forms of reasoning in AI.
However, we here do not attempt to characterize MR, let alone cover all of its branches. Rather,
we focus on the MR branches that most prominently exhibit approaches to explainability. Our
overview of MR explainability is therefore bounded in scope. Nonetheless, it is dictated by our
(invariably limited) professional understanding of the most relevant (e.g. historically important,
well established and widely applicable, or trending) MR contributions to XAI.
2. Accordingly, we acknowledge that explainability in AI has been studied for a while and has
in time evolved in terms of (a) areas of AI and (b) desiderata. Yet, we maintain that the foun-
dational contributions and the lessons learnt (as well as forgotten) from the research on ex-
plainability in KR and expert systems are still very much relevant to both MR explainability in
particular, and XAI at large. Specifically:
(a) Adaptations of long established MR explainability techniques (Classical Logic-Based
Reasoning and Non-classical Logic-Based Reasoning (Logic Programming); see Sections
3.1 and 3.2 respectively) have found their ways into newer MR areas (for instance, Axiom
Pinpointing in Description Logics and Planning; see Sections 3.1.1 and 3.5 respectively).
(b) Relatively newer MR branches, such as Answer Set Programming (ASP, Section 3.2.3)
and Argumentation (Section 3.3), necessitate and inform newer forms of explainability.
In particular, previously established techniques of mostly logical inference attribution do
not suffice anymore, see e.g. [82, 123, 151, 204]. On the one hand, some modern MR
approaches, such as ASP and Constraint Programming (CP, Section 3.1.2), currently pro-
vide techniques that can effectively be considered interpretable but whose workings are
nevertheless difficult to explain. On the other hand, XAI desiderata now include aiming
for dialogical/conversational explanations, interactivity, actionability as well as causality.
These rediscovered concerns are being addressed by modern MR approaches to explain-
ability. Thus, various branches of MR are concerned with explainability anew.
3. We maintain that modern MR systems can hardly be called explainable just by virtue of being
symbolic4, in contrast to early expert and intelligent systems often being referred to thus [1].
However, we speculate and contend that MR presumably offers more immediate intelligibility
than e.g. ML. Perhaps this is what lends MR explainability approaches to be applied to both MR
itself and other areas of research, such as ML (e.g. [3, 15, 51, 106, 185]), decision support and
recommender systems (e.g. [45, 80, 158, 172]), planning (e.g. [38, 44, 69, 74, 81]), scheduling
4Where symbolic entities carry intrinsic semantical meaning and are perhaps more readily interpretable and intelligible
than the algebraic-symbolic entities in sub-symbolic/connectionist AI.
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(e.g. [58]), legal informatics (e.g. [17, 57]), scientific debates (e.g. [183]). We speculate that
it is also potentially the theoretical guarantees often ensured by MR methods that make MR
explainability appealing, cf. e.g. [105, 187].
4. Most recent overviews of general XAI appear to focus mostly on ML and somewhat ignore
MR, e.g. [1, 13, 96, 146, 149, 177], apart from potentially briefly discussing early expert sys-
tems. (See however [158] for a systematic review of explanations in decision support and rec-
ommender systems, where MR constitutes majority of the referenced approaches; reviews of
explainability in e.g. ASP [78] and Planning [44] are also welcome examples of not-so-common
area-specific MR overviews.) We feel that having a broader view of the XAI agenda is crucial
in general and that an overview of MR explainability is due for at least the following reasons.
(a) Explainable MR constitutes a rich body of research whose works span many branches of
MR with long histories. A consolidated, even if limited, overview will provide guidance
to exploring and building on this research.
(b) MR explainability techniques are also used for e.g. explainable ML and an overview will
help AI researchers to see a bigger picture of XAI as well as to promote innovation and
collaboration.
(c) XAI has arguably started with explainable MR and some of the same conceptual MR
explainability techniques can be (and are being) applied to achieve current XAI goals.
An MR explainability overview may allow researchers to rediscover known problems and
solutions (potentially saving from reinventing things) and to give credit where it is due.
1.2 Contributions
Our contributions in this report are as follows.
1. Building on conceptual works on XAI as well as XAI overviews, we propose a loose catego-
rization of MR explainability approaches in terms of broad families of explanations, namely
attributive, contrastive and actionable.
2. We provide an overview of some prominent approaches to MR explainability, differentiating by
branches of MR and indicating the families that such explanations roughly belong to.
3. We indicate what kinds of questions the explanations aim to answer.
This is not a systematic review, but rather an overview of conceptual techniques that MR brings
to XAI. We do not claim to be exhaustive or even completely representative of the various MR ap-
proaches to explainability, let alone to characterize what counts as a branch of MR. Rather, we hope
to enable the reader to see a bigger picture of XAI, focusing specifically on what we believe amounts
to MR explainability.
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1.3 Omissions
In this report, we omit the following aspects of XAI.
• We leave out the following research areas that could potentially be considered related to MR.
1. Rule-based classification/prediction, e.g. [209], which comprises of largely ML-focused
approaches for associative/predictive rule generation and/or extraction. Overviews of such
rule-based ML explainability can be found in e.g. [1, 9, 13, 96].
2. Neuro-symbolic computing and graph neural networks, see e.g. [129] for an overview,
where the use of classical logics alongside ML techniques has recently been argued as
a factor enabling explainability. Other works use classical logic for approximation and
human-readable representation of ML workings. For instance, the authors in [47, 48]
use neural networks to learn relationships between ML classifier outputs and interpret
those relationships using Boolean variables that represent neuron activations as well as
predicates that represent the classification outputs. These then yield human-readable first-
order logic descriptions of the learned relationships. Neuro-symbolic computing com-
prises heavily of ML-focused approaches that we deem beyond the scope of this report on
MR explainability.
3. Probabilistic reasoning, which is a field (of Mathematics as well as Computer Science)
in itself, and spans AI at large. We meet several explanation-oriented approaches when
discussing various MR branches, but we do not separately consider Bayesian Networks or
Probabilistic Graphical Models among MR branches with a focus on explainability.
4. Game theory, which is a field of Mathematics that studies strategic interaction between
rational decision makers. In AI, game theory provides foundations to reasoning with pref-
erences, multi-agent systems (MAS) and mechanism design among others, possibly with
the benefit of enabling explainability. SHAP (Shapley additive explanations) [140] is a
well-known example of application of game theory to explainability in ML as well as MR
(e.g. [126]). We do not think that game-theoretic approaches constitute a branch of MR,
or at least not one with a particular focus to explainability. We do, however, review some
related approaches to explainability from Decision Theory.
5. Robotics, which is an interdisciplinary branch of Engineering and Computer Science. In
terms of explainability, the cornerstone notion there is explainable agency [130], which
amounts to an autonomous agent being able to do the following:
(a) explain decisions made during plan generation;
(b) report which actions it executed;
(c) explain how actual events diverged from a plan and how it adapted in response;
(d) communicate its decisions and reasons.
In [10] Anjomshoae et al. review explainable agency approaches where goal-driven agents
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and robots purport to explain their actions to a human user. We encounter some approaches
to explainability of autonomous agents which belong to specific branches of MR such as
Planning. Generally, however, explainable agency considers human-AI interaction aspects
which we do not cover in this report.
• Medium of explanations, i.e. whether explanations are textual, graphical, etc., see e.g. [93,
128, 149, 189]. However important, these are largely human-AI interaction aspects, beyond the
scope of this report.
• Evaluation of explanations is beyond the scope of this report too. We believe that, on the one
hand, well-established computational metrics for systematic comparison and evaluation of ex-
planations are generally lacking [97],5 which we believe is especially true with respect to MR
approaches to explainability. On the other hand, we believe that research on evaluation of,
particularly, MR explainability approaches via human user studies is complicated and not yet
mature either, see e.g. [149].
We hope these omissions do not lessen our contribution of a conceptual overview of MR explain-
ability.
2 Explainability
We briefly discuss here the main purposes of explanations in AI systems and present a categorization
of explanations. We propose that, intuitively, the main purpose of explanations in XAI is to enable the
user of an AI system to not only understand (to a certain extent) the system, but also to do something
with the explanation. We suggest this entails that the explanations answer some sort of questions about
the AI system dealing with the problem at hand. The kinds of answers provided by the explanations
will help us to loosely categorize them, enabled by approaches to explainability in MR.
2.1 Purpose of Explanations
At large, the purpose of explainability of an AI system can be seen to be two-fold, to quote from [110,
p. 160]:
The system either provides knowledge and explanations necessary for the user to carry
out his or her task, or alternatively, the system carries out some action and then explains
the need and reason for the action the system itself has taken to the user.
Borrowing from [13, p. 85, our emphasis], we stipulate what an explainable AI system entails:
Given an audience, an explainable Artificial Intelligence is one that produces details or
reasons to make its functioning clear or easy to understand.
5Though the literature on computational measures of explainability in ML is expanding, see e.g. [37, 149].
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In other words, an explainable AI system has to first produce details and reasons underlying its
functioning – call this an explanation. It is then upon the explainee (i.e. the recipient or user of the
explanation, also called the audience) to take in the explanation. Thus, we are interested in the purpose
of an explanation (see e.g. [149, 158, 176, 194]) from the explainee point-of-view:
“What will I (i.e. the agent, human or artificial) do with the explanation?”
We do not attempt a representative list of the purposes of explanations, but nevertheless give some
examples. For instance, an expert in the domain in which an AI system is applied may want to do any
one of the following:
a) Understand how the system functions in general, in mundane situations, whence they expect
explanations to pertain to certain known aspects of the domain;
b) Learn how the system outputs aspects of the domain that are unexpected to the expert;
c) Confirm and compare the system’s behavior in both expected and unexpected situations;
d) Act on the produced knowledge, whence they expect guidance towards desirable results.
Different purposes of explanations are well reflected by what are called XAI design goals in
[149], that amount to “identifying the purpose for explanation and choosing what to explain for the
targeted end-user and dedicated application.” See also e.g. [158, 194] for purposes of, particularly,
human-centric explanations in AI. Note, however, that we do not limit ourselves to human users of
AI systems. Instead, we allow AI (or otherwise intelligent machine) agents themselves to require
explanations from AI systems. Considering the progress in developing intelligent machines and au-
tonomous systems, it seems natural to foresee situations where an AI agent probes another for e.g. a
justification of the latter’s (intended) actions in order to achieve or negotiate common goals.
We do acknowledge that the intended purpose is part of the explanation’s context, among other
factors such as the explainer, the explainee and the communication medium [194]. The context, specif-
ically the explainee, may inform or correlate with the purpose of explanations, especially in cases of
human audiences [13, 149, 198, 214]. But that need not generally be the case: if the explainees are
people, then it is “people’s goals or intended uses of the technology, rather than their social role”
[214] that shape the explainability desiderata. Note that there can be both AI-to-human and AI-to-AI
explainability, but we consider the purpose of explanations, rather than the nature of the explainee, to
be primary.
Finally, we recognize that various usability desiderata [189], including actionability (see e.g. [59,
123, 189]), are key to the purpose of explainability. We thus maintain that irrespective of the purpose
of explanations, for the explainee to consume and act upon, i.e. “to do something with” an explanation,
the explanation has to answer some question(s) about the AI system and its functioning. We discuss
next how explanations in MR (and potentially in AI at large) can be categorized according to the
questions they aim to answer.
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2.2 High-level Questions
Intuitively, answering what-, why-, when-, how-types of questions about an AI system’s functioning
falls under the purview of explainability [81, 137, 149, 155]. At a high-level, we are interested in the
following questions:
Q1 Given a representation of the problem and given a query, e.g. a decision taken or an observation,
what are the reasons underlying the inference pertaining to the query?
Q2 Given a representation of the problem and its solution or an answer to a query, why is something
else not a solution or an answer?
Q3 Given different information or query, e.g. a different decision or observation, would the solu-
tion/answer change too, and how? (Purely based on explanation, without recomputing!)
Q4 Given a representation of the problem and its current solution, and given a representation of a
desired outcome, what decisions or actions can be taken to improve the current solution and to
achieve an outcome as close as possible to the desired one?
These questions need not be limited to MR, but may well apply to e.g. ML too.
Questions of type Q1 pertain to inputs to the system (see e.g. [137, p. 14]), definitions and meaning
of internal representations (see e.g. [155, p. 387], [128, p. 110], [32, p. 164]) and attribution of those
to the outputs (see e.g. [149]). Such questions aim at soliciting “insight about the information that is
utilized and the rules, processes or steps that are used by the system to reach the recommendation or
the outcome it has generated for a particular case.”[93, p.1483] Answers to Q1 type of questions thus
“inform users of the current (or previous) system state” and how the system “derived its output value
from the current (or previous) input values”[137, p. 14].
Questions of type Q2 and Q3 pertain to reasons against the current outcome and in favor of alter-
native outcomes as well as to alternative inputs and parameters (see e.g. [32, 81, 128, 137, 149, 155]).
Such questions solicit characterization of “the reasons for differences between a model prediction and
the user’s expected outcome.”[149] Answers to Q2 and Q3 types of questions thus “inform users why
an alternative output value was not produced given the current input values” and “could provide users
with enough information to achieve the alternative output value”[32, p. 167].
Questions of type Q4 pertain to changes to inputs, modelling or the problem itself that would
lead to user-desired outputs (see e.g. [137, 149]). Such questions aim at soliciting “hypothetical ad-
justments to the input or model that would result in a different output”[149]. Answers to Q4 type of
questions thus provide guidelines that help the user to achieve a (more) desired outcome.
We next propose a loose categorization of explanations in MR (and potentially AI at large) that
places explanations in families of types of explanations aiming to answer the high-level questions.
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2.3 Categorization for Explanations
The driving factors of our categorization are the questions that explanations specifically in various
MR approaches aim to answer. Building on other works that aim at classifications/categorizations of
explanations, see [93, 100, 110, 123, 128, 137, 144, 149, 151, 152, 169, 177, 189, 207], we distinguish
three families/types of explanations: attributive (e.g. logical inference attribution, feature importance
association), contrastive (e.g. reasons con as well as pro, counterfactuals), actionable (e.g. guidelines
towards a desired outcome, realizable actions). We characterize these families of explanations using
the following notions.6
Abstractly, we assume at hand
an AI system S that given information i yields outcome o.
For instance, in some forms of MR, the system can be instantiated by a knowledge baseKB consisting
of background knowledge, that given information (e.g. a query) i represented in symbolic form entails
(for some variant of formally defined entailment |=) inference o:
KB ∪ {i} |= o
In some forms of ML, the role of the system can be taken by a model or function f : X → Y (trained
on some set X ′ ⊆ X of data), that given instance i ∈ X assigns to it a label o ∈ Y :
f(i) = o
The above are but examples of high-level descriptions of AI methodologies. They are nevertheless
helpful to find intuitions behind the explanation categories suggested as follows.
2.3.1 Attributive Explanations
Attributive explanations (see e.g. [140, 144, 151]) rely on the notions such as trace, justification,
attribution and association, widely used in MR and ML literature alike. At a high level, they aim to
answer the following question:
Q1 Given a representation of the problem and given a query, e.g. a decision taken or an observation,
what are the reasons underlying the inference pertaining to the query?
Or, using the notions above:
What are the details and reasons for system S yielding outcome o, given information i?
6Note that these are not formal definitions or descriptions. We believe that due to diversity of MR a formalization of
such terms would be incomplete, controversial and unhelpful, if not impractical or outright impossible. Instead, we use
natural language descriptions to practically convey our ideas and supply intuition.
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Attributive explanations justify o by attributing to/associating with o (parts of) S and i. If applica-
ble, attributive explanations may contain a trace of such attribution/association. In MR, for instance,
using the above notation, an attributive explanation for o given i can be
KB ′ ⊆ KB such that KB ′ ∪ {i} |= o
Normally, if applicable, suchKB ′ would be required to be minimal (for some form of minimality, e.g.
subset inclusion), consistent (for some notion of consistency or non-contradiction) and informative (or
non-trivial), see e.g. [73] for formalization in logical terms. As a trace,KB ′ can contain e.g. inference
rules, proof or some sort of argument for o given i. In the case of ML, an attributive explanation can
be some minimal part iˆ of instance i that suffices for f to yield o (irrespective of the rest of i), see e.g.
[105] for examples of such explanations for ML classifications, formalized as well in logical terms.
In another form, for instance in planning, an attributive explanation could exhibit (the relevant part
of) the model of the problem or the state the model is in, given i, together with relational or causal
links to o.
Attributive explanations are easy to design and are therefore commonplace [93, p.1483]. They are
prevalent in all MR branches we consider in this report, perhaps most prominently in Classical Logic-
Based Reasoning (Section 3.1). That they are prominent among classical-logic based approaches to
explainability is not surprising because, as we have seen, explainability started with early AI systems
which were largely based on classical logics. That attributive explanations are prevalent in all MR
approaches to explainability is not surprising either, because attribution can be seen to be necessary
for building the more advanced contrastive and actionable explanations (see e.g. [149]).
2.3.2 Contrastive Explanations
Contrastive explanations (see e.g. [110, 120, 144, 149, 188, 191]) pertain to the notions such as
criticism, contrast, counterfactual and dialogue. At a high level, they aim to answer the following
questions:
Q2 Given a representation of the problem and its solution or an answer to a query, why is something
else not a solution or an answer?
Q3 Given different information or query, e.g. a different decision or observation, would the solu-
tion/answer change too, and how? (Purely based on explanation, without recomputing!)
In other words:
What are the details and reasons of system S yielding outcome o rather than different
outcome o′, given information i?
And supposing that the given information is not i (but some different i′), would o′ be the
outcome?
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Contrastive explanations address potential criticisms of the yielded outcome o given information i by
dealing with contrastive outcomes o′ and information i′.
On the one hand, in addition to an attributive explanation as to why S yields o given i, contrastive
explanations can provide counterexamples attributing to (parts of) S and i why o′ is not possible. For
instance, consider a classical logic-based setting where background knowledge KB is queried with i,
expecting a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ outcome o ∈ {y, n} (regarding e.g. provability of i from KB ). If o = n, then
a contrastive explanation as a counterexample to the alternative outcome o′ = y could be a model M
in which KB ∪{¬i} hold true. In forms of ML, a contrastive explanation as a counterexample can be
some minimal part iˆ of instance i that prevents f from yielding o (irrespective of the rest of i without
iˆ). In, say, planning, a contrastive explanation as a counterexample can be some part of the model that
together with the given information makes some goal unachievable.
On the other hand, contrastive explanations can work via counterfactuals, see e.g. [33, 90, 203].
Taken plainly, a “counterfactual is a statement such as, ‘if p, then q,’ where the premise p is either
known or expected to be false.”[90, p. 35] In contrast to attributive explanations and counterexamples,
“counterfactuals continue functioning in an end-to-end integrated approach”[203, p. 850], indicating
consequences of changing the given information. So counterfactual contrastive explanations are about
making or imagining different choices and analyzing what could happen or could have happened. Of-
ten, counterfactual contrastive explanations address changes with respect to more desirable outcomes
than the one yielded by the AI system [33, 90, 203].
In our terms, where i is information at hand, a counterfactual invites one to consider what happens
if different (and thus currently false) information i′ were at hand, speculating that it may lead to a
different, perhaps more desirable, outcome o′. In more conventional MR terms then, a contrastive
explanation as a counterfactual can for instance be a
modification i′ of i such that KB ∪ {i′} |= o′
Taken together with the system S yielding outcome o given information i, this expresses that ‘if i′
rather than i was given, then o′ rather than o would be the outcome’.
Note though that it may be that no such modification is achievable or desirable, perhaps due to
restrictions placed by the underlying application. However, if it is, then it may be reasonable to strive
for some minimal modification i′ that is in some sense most similar to i. In addition, an attributive
explanation could be incorporated by, for instance, exhibiting some minimal KB ′ ⊆ KB such that
KB ′ ∪ {i′} |= o′, so that the counterfactual explanation indicates some minimal modification of the
given information which together with some background knowledge suffices to yield a more desirable
outcome. Similarly, in ML terms, if at least part iˆ of instance i needs to be changed for f to yield o′
instead of o, then a contrastive explanation as a counterfactual can be some minimal modification i′
of i (if it exists) that necessitates f to yield o′. In planning, a given difficult goal can be reduced to
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a sub-goal by considering counterfactual “if only thus-and-so were true, I would be able to solve the
original problem” as a contrastive explanation, which then entails “arranging for thus-and-so to be
true”[90, p. 36], if possible.
Another variant of contrastive explanations in MR takes form in graph-like representations of
pros and cons of reasoning outcomes. Explanations of this type amount to defining a formal structure,
which can usually be represented as a graph, that consists of information KB ′ ⊆ KB most relevant
for yielding the outcome o given i, together with relationships among KB ′ ∪ {i, o} revealing infor-
mation dependencies and/or which information is in favor or against o. Such graph-like explanations
are popular in Answer Set Programming (ASP), where they can be comprised of the (positive and
negative) literals and rules considered in deriving the answer o to the query i from a logic program
KB , see Section 3.2.3. They are also prevalent in Argumentation, where graphs capture the relevant
supporting and conflicting information from KB ∪{i} that allows to contrast the justifications of, and
counterexamples to o. Such graph-based explanations provide basis for dialogical explanations that
formalize criticism and defense of the yielded outcome. Just as counterfactual explanations, dialogical
ones allow the explainee to be engaged, rather than simply presented, with explanations.
Contrastive explanations of these and similar various forms appear in Constraint Programming
(CP), Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) and Proof Assistants, forms of abductive reasoning, An-
swer Set Programming (ASP), Argumentation, Planning. They are non-trivial to define and design,
given the usually numerous contrastive situations, alternative answers and solutions. Overall, con-
trastive explanations, especially counterfactual and dialogical ones, are strongly related to actionable
explanations, in that contrastive explanations can support provision of actions and guidelines follow-
ing which the AI system will yield a desired outcome.
2.3.3 Actionable Explanations
We maintain that actionable explanations (see e.g. [59, 123, 189]) should be interventional, interac-
tive, collaborative, pedagogic. At a high level, they aim to answer the following question:
Q4 Given a representation of the problem and its current solution, and given a representation of a
desired outcome, what decisions or actions can be taken to improve the current solution and to
achieve an outcome as close as possible to the desired one?
In other words:
What can be done in order for system S to yield outcome o, given information i?
Actionable explanations address potential interventions that may yield a desired outcome o, given
information i. They entail both interaction and collaboration between the system and its user in that
actionable explanations guide or teach the user on what actions/changes can be taken/made and the
user may choose to follow them or not to. Importantly, actionable explanations allow to take actions or
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make changes that alter the system and possibly the problem themselves. For instance, in MR terms,
an actionable explanation can be a
modification KB ′ of KB such that KB ′ ∪ {i} |= o
As with contrastive explanations, it would obviously be normal to require some minimality of the
modification KB ′ and its similarity to KB (note that minimality may be a complicated aspect espe-
cially with respect to non-monotonic entailment). Additionally, an actionable explanation can supply
a modification i′ of i such that KB ′ ∪ {i′} |= o, similarly to a counterfactual contrastive explanation.
In forms of ML, an actionable explanation can be some designation of the model’s f parameter
changes that result in a modified model f ′ such that f ′(i) = o. (This can be achieved e.g. by directly
modifying the weights, or the classification thresholds or even the training set, see e.g. [123] for
examples of such actionable explanations for Naive Bayes Classifiers). In planning or scheduling, an
actionable explanation can be some minimal change of goals or resources (i.e. modification of the
problem and hence the solver’s model) that are needed to attain a (solvable problem and its) solution
satisfying as much as possible the initial goals and constraints.
Actionable explanations also apply to the situations where the world itself changes (i.e. not nec-
essarily as a consequence of the user’s actions) and the previous outcomes/solutions are no longer
good or do not exist at all, so that explanations provide guidance in order to obtain new or better
outcomes/solutions. For instance, the background knowledge KB or the input space X of the model
f may change and the previous queries or inferences become invalid, whence actionable explanations
answer why and how to react. Ideally, actionable explanations would enable a meaningful interaction
between an AI system and its user (again, human or machine, indifferently) leading to a fruitful collab-
oration. Such an interaction could be for instance conversational, formalized as dialogue between the
user and the system, see e.g. [18, 51, 57, 101, 110, 121, 128, 144, 146, 150, 151, 186, 188, 190, 204].
Perhaps due to their inherent complexity of taking into account arguably more consequential
changes as well as attributions and contrasts, actionable explanations are not very prominent in MR.
We believe that they exist perhaps to a limited extent in e.g. Argumentation.
3 MR Branches and Explanations
We here overview branches of MR where explainability is studied. We do not claim to define what
counts as MR but offer our perspective. We think that assignment to MR of some approaches, par-
ticularly those falling into Classical Logic-Based Reasoning, Non-classical Logic-Based Reasoning
(Logic Programming) and Argumentation, will not be controversial. We likewise feel that Decision
Theory and Planning belong well to MR too. However, we admit that Multi-Agent Systems and
Causal Approaches can be regarded as more interdisciplinary branches, but we maintain to consider
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approaches within the realm of MR. Finally, Reinforcement Learning is traditionally an area within
ML, but there are some approaches (that we focus on) that use MR techniques (as understood in this
report) for explainability.
3.1 Classical Logic-Based Reasoning
Arguably the most well established and far-back dating MR explainability techniques rest on classical
logic-based derivation/deduction. Falappa et al. outline well in [73] the notion of explanation used in
logic-based reasoning formalisms as follows. An explanation for a sentence a is a minimal, consistent
and informative set A of sentences deducing a (where minimality is with respect to subset inclusion
⊆, consistency and deduction are formalized with respect the underlying logic and informativeness
requires the consequences of A to not be properly included among the consequences of a):
A ` a,
A 0 ⊥,
B 6` a for B ( A,
Cn(A) * Cn(a).
At large, such logic-based explanations aim to answer the following kinds of questions:
• What explains a given observation (o)?
• Which information logically entails a given inference (o)?
• Why is a given formula derived or not?
• Why is a set of formulas a solution?
Since such and similar explanations in logic-based reasoning are generally non-unique, preferred
explanations are often selected using some specific ordering criteria [165] with various forms of mini-
mality (e.g. cardinality, depth of proof/inference) being a frequent choice. Different works apply these
logic-based explanation ideas for explainability in various settings, including the so-called Model Di-
agnosis (e.g. [60, 167, 175]), abductive reasoning (see Sections 3.1.5, 3.2.1) and non-classical logic-
based approaches such as Logic Programming (LP, see Section 3.2). In this section we review some
prominent MR explainability techniques from various classical logic-based approaches to reasoning.
3.1.1 Axiom Pinpointing
Axiom pinpointing [164] in description logics (which are decidable fragments of first-order logic) is
a very good example of the well established logic-based explanation concepts still being very much
relevant in modern MR explainability. Axiom pinpointing amounts to finding axioms in a knowledge
base that entail or prevent a given consequence/query, whereby minimal such sets of axioms are taken
14 Ericsson Research
K. Cˇyras et al. Report on Explainability in Machine Reasoning
as justifications/explanations. Such explanations aim to answer the following question:
• given a knowledge base KB (possibly inconsistent, with an inconsistency-tolerant semantics)
and a query Q (e.g. a Boolean conjunctive), why is Q (not) entailed by KB? [12, 19]
Works of [19, 39, 104, 114, 139] are examples of explaining knowledge base query answering where
explanations are defined as (minimal) subsets entailing or contradicting a given query with respect to
a (consistent or inconsistent) knowledge base. Roughly then, in our terms, given a knowledge base
KB and query i, an explanation for the outcome o ∈ {y, n} (representing ‘yes’ for ‘entailed’ and
‘no’ for ‘not entailed’, respectively) is a ⊆-minimal KB ′ ⊆ KB such that KB ′ |= i, if o = y, and a
⊆-minimal KB ′ ⊆ KB such that KB ′ ∪ {i} |= bot, if o = n. Such explanations are attributive.
3.1.2 Constraint Programming (CP)
Constraint Programming (CP) [178] is a paradigm for solving combinatorial search problems, often
called Constraint Satisfaction Problems (CSPs). CSPs are represented in terms of decision variables
and constraints, usually in classical logic vocabulary, and solving them amounts to finding value
assignments to variables that satisfy all the constraints.7
Already in mid-90s it was understood that explanations in CP cannot simply amount to tracing of
solutions but need to be much more sophisticated. To quote from [82, p. 4860],
A natural approach to providing a richer explanation of a solution would be to ‘trace’ the
program’s solution process. However, constraint solvers generally employ search, and
tracing search tends not to provide a very satisfying explanation. For backtrack search: “I
tried this and then that and hit a dead end, so I tried the other instead”. Even worse, for
local search: “I kept getting better, but then I tried some other random thing”.
Apart from search, inference is a critical part of constraint solving and was used early for explain-
ability. For instance, in [192], a “trace of the inference, with some rudimentary natural language
processing, provided explanations for puzzles taken from newsstand puzzle booklets that were rea-
sonably similar to the answer explanations provided in the back of the booklets.”[82, p. 4860] Overall
in CP, “much of the work on explaining failure actually is focused on programs explaining interme-
diate failures to themselves in order to reach a solution more efficiently.”[82, p. 4860]. The questions
that explanations in CP aim to answer include the following.
• Why is there a conflict between these parts of the system? [83]
• Which constraints result into failure? [111]
• Why does this parameter have to have this value? [83]
• What are the next propagation steps? [65, 208]
• Which choices should I relax in order to recover consistency? [7, 82]
7We note that it is also very natural to use LP (see Section 3.2) in solving CSPs.
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• Which choices should I relax in order to render such a value available for such a variable?
[7, 82]
• From which subsets of current choices did inconsistency follow? [7, 82]
• Why is this value not available any longer for this variable? [7, 82]
We review below several approaches in CP to devising explanations that answer such questions.
In his seminal paper [111] from 2004, Junker proposed QuickXplain – a general purpose tech-
nique for explainability in constraint programming. In a general setting of constraints (including e.g.
CP, Satisfiability (SAT) and Beyond, description logics), relaxations (resp. conflicts) are defined as
sets of constraints for which (resp. no) solution exists. Conflicts thus explain solution failure, relax-
ations restore consistency. However, both are generally exponential to construct and present, whereas
a user may desire explanations pertaining to the most important constraints. Thus, preferred relax-
ations and preferred conflicts are defined to be minimal with respect to lexicographic orderings (over
relaxations and conflicts) defined using any total order over constraints. In practice, this amounts to
successively adding the most preferred constraints until they fail and then removing the least pre-
ferred constraints as long as that preserves failure. Explainability-wise, “preferred conflicts explain
why best elements cannot be added to preferred relaxations”.[111, p. 169]8 Further, the described
“checking based methods for computing explanations work for any solver and do not require that the
solver identifies its precise inferences.”[111, p. 172] In a more general CP setting [162] similar to
[111], O’Sullivan et al. propose representative explanations (and algorithms thereof) in which “every
constraint that can be satisfied is shown in a relaxation and every constraint that must be excluded is
shown in an exclusion set.”[162, p. 328]
Other works, notably alldifferent [65], produce explanations for improving solver strategies. The
motivation of Downing et al. is as follows [65, p. 116, emphasis original]:
Whenever a propagator changes a domain it must explain how the change occurred in
terms of literals, that is, each literal l that is made true must be explained by a clause
L → l where L is a (set or) conjunction of literals. When the propagator causes failure
it must explain the failure as a nogood, L → ⊥, with L a conjunction of literals which
cannot hold simultaneously.
Roughly then, the propagator’s actions can be explained using cut-sets, where an explanation is ef-
fectively a logical constraint on (the values of) variables. Similar ideas using a lazy clause generation
solver for explaining propagation via constraints from which nogoods can be computed can be applied
to string edit distance constraints, e.g. in [208] Winter et al. use explanations that consist of literals
which logically entail the truth of a Boolean variable that encodes propagation of some variable’s
value.
8Effectively, such explanations can be seen as a form of Brewka’s preferred subtheories [29] in the language of con-
straints.
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In [7] Amilhastre et al. provide “explanations for some user’s choices and ways to restore con-
sistency”, whereby “the user specifies her requirements by interactively giving values to variables
or more generally by stating some unary constraints that restrict the possible values of the decision
variables.” The goal is to “provide the user with explanations of the conflicts” in terms of “(minimal)
inconsistent subsets of the current set of choices.” From a technical point-of-view, “in order to cir-
cumvent intractability from the practical side, [the] approach relies on a compilation of the original
problem into a data structure from which much better performances can be obtained”, specifically an
“automaton that represents the set of solutions of the CSP.”
O’Callaghan, O’Sullivan, and Freuder argue in [160] that “desirable is an explanation that is cor-
rective in the sense that it provides the basis for moving forward in the problem-solving process” and
formally define a corrective explanation intuitively as “a reassignment of a subset of the user’s unary
decision constraints that enables the user to assign at least one more variable”, providing as well an
algorithm for computing corrective explanations of minimal length.
Recently, there have also been works that consider a constraint solver assisting a human user in
solving some logical problem. For instance, in [21] Bogaerts et al. “the propagation of a constraint
solver through a sequence of small inference steps”. They use minimal unsatisfiable sets of constraints
for generating explanations of the solver’s individual inference steps and the explanations can overall
be seen as proofs or traces of the solver’s working towards a solution.
Overall, explanations in CP can be roughly described as follows. Given a set KB of constraints,
with i being the latest propagation, variable assignment or user added constraint(s), an explanation for
the latest inference o (variable value restriction, e.g. l = > or v ∈ [1, 3], or failure ⊥) is a ⊆-minimal
KB ′ ⊆ KB such that KB ′ ∪ {i} |= o. This falls into the category of attributive explanations.
Instead, contrastive explanations that answer questions pertaining to indication of constraints
or variable values leading to inconsistencies and consistency restoration can be defined as follows.
Given KB ∪ {i} |= o and an alternative outcome o′ 6= o, an explanation as a counterfactual can be
a modification i′ of i such that KB ∪ {i′} |= o′. In particular, if the outcome o = ⊥ means that i
cannot be satisfied given KB (i.e. i cannot be extended to a solution of the CSP) then an explanation
for an alternative outcome (i.e. where a solution can be found) is a minimal KB ′ ⊆ KB such that
KB ′ ∪ {i} |= ⊥ and a modification i′ of i such that KB ∪ {i′} 6|= ⊥.
3.1.3 Satisfiability (SAT) and Beyond
Solving Satisfiability (SAT) problems [62] is a special case of CSP solving. Satisfying assignments
are also referred to as implicants. Prime implicants are then implicants of minimal size, in the sense
that they satisfy the formula using a minimal set of assigned variables. Prime implicants can thus
be seen as attributive explanations. Indeed, Ignatiev, Narodytska, and Marques-Silva exploit prime
implicants in [107] to define logical explanations and counterexamples with respect to ML model
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classifications. Specifically, given a Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP)/Satisfiability Mod-
ulo Theories (SMT) encoding of an ML model (exactly representing its behavior), an assignment to
variables corresponds to an input/instance, with each variable corresponding to a feature. A satis-
fying assignment, for an ML model in which the prediction has been fixed, represents an instance
which maps to that prediction. For a given instance then, a corresponding prime implicant explains
the model’s prediction/inference.9
As with general CP, another challenge is that of explaining inconsistency or unsolvability. Given
an unsatisfiable formula, modern SAT solvers are able to report a proof of its unsatisfiability together
with its support, also known as (unsatisfiable) core. A core is a subset of the original formula which is
itself unsatisfiable. Although usually smaller than the original formula, a core might not yet be mini-
mal. Instead, Minimal Unsatisfiable Subformulas (MUSes) are cores of minimal size, in the sense that
every subset of a MUS is satisfiable. MUSes can thus be regarded as explanations of unsatisfiability
[170] since they represent the culprits generating an inconsistency, and in fact suffice to generate a
conflict in the formula, regardless of the rest. Multiple MUSes can exist in a formula and so multi-
ple explanations abound, giving rise to both attributive and contrastive explanations, answering the
following questions.
• Which information minimally entails a given inference?
• Which information prevents a given logical expression to be satisfied?
Analysis of inconsistent formulas plays an important role in MR explainability, since many, if not
all, of the approaches for extracting classical logic-based explanations can be reduced to this problem.
In addition, MUSes are widely used as building blocks of explanations in other MR approaches, for
instance Planning (see e.g. [69, 70]), Argumentation (see e.g. [157]), Decision Theory (see e.g. [22]).
3.1.4 Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) and Proof Assistants
Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) is a procedure whereby a tool known as a “theorem prover” is
provided a proposition, and it returns ‘true’ or ‘false’ (or runs out of time). Theorem provers have
matured tremendously in recent years, and are now used in many settings, not only for arithmetic. In
general, SAT solvers, SMT solvers, and model checkers also fall under the ambit of theorem proving.
If a theorem prover returns ‘false’, it also generates a falsifying counterexample, as a contrastive
explanation to the user as to why the proposition does not hold. However, most theorem provers
provide no explanation for a proposition which is verified to be true [79, 195].
Proof assistants are special kinds of theorem provers (often called interactive theorem provers).
These are hybrid tools that automate the more routine aspects of building proofs while depending
on human guidance for more difficult aspects. One can write a theory of one’s choice, and verify
9In the basence of logical representation, one can instead define prime implicant explanations for ML classification
directly as minimal sets of features of an instance that suffice to yield the classification, see e.g. [185].
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whether or not a proposition holds of this theory. Well known examples of general proof assistants
are Isabelle10, F*, Coq11 etc. [16]. Specialized proof assistants exist as well, such as Tamarin for
security protocol verification. The user can write any theory supported by a proof assistant and verify
a proposition in that theory, rather than being limited to some theory of the designer’s choice. Proof
assistants are being widely used for a variety of applications, including building verified compilers
[122] and verified implementations of processors [171].
However, a proof assistant might return a true/false answer, run out of time, or stop at a subgoal
that it does not “know” how to solve. In the last case, the user might need to write helper code and
expand the theory. In essence, proof assistants are interactive, that is, they often require more input
from the user to solve “difficult” goals. If a proof assistant returns ‘true’, it generates a sequence of
steps that one can then use to replicate the proof by hand for better understanding. Some specialized
proof assistants generate counterexamples if the proposition is found to be ‘false’, but not all of them
do – Coq, for instance, would just show the user some pending goals which it cannot solve (and the
statements corresponding to these goals might themselves be false), or throw an error message to say
that the proposition cannot be proved true by some underlying decision procedure.
In sum, explanations from theorem provers aim at answering the following questions.
• If a proposition is true, what is a (shortest/most readable) proof?
• If a proposition is false, what is a counterexample?
The first type of explanations are attributive, whereas the second are contrastive (as counterexam-
ples).
There are obviously open problems pertaining to explainability in ATP, to name a few. 1. Can a
theorem prover/proof assistant also be optimized to provide the “best” counterexample, according to
some measure? 2. Can non-interactive theorem provers also provide explanations/proof descriptions
for propositions that are verified to be true? What would these explanations look like? 3. If a (sub)goal
involves an unsolvable loop which leads to a timeout, can this be output as an explanation instead of
(or in addition to) timing out? Furthermore, currently the explanations generated by most theorem
provers and proof assistants are not very human-friendly. Some proofs/counterexamples generated
by some theorem provers can take hundreds of lines, making it difficult for a human to use these to
understand the underlying (mal)functioning of the system. There is some work [85] along the lines
of designing provers which produce proofs that look like ones humans might write, but only for very
specific domains.
In terms of AI-to-AI or machine-to-machine explanations, one can consider the example of proof-
carrying code, where an application downloaded from an untrustworthy location comes with a proof
of its “correctness” for the host system to verify before installation. No human intervention is needed
in order to either generate the proof or to verify it. This can be considered an example of the general
10https://isabelle.in.tum.de/
11https://coq.inria.fr/
19 Ericsson Research
K. Cˇyras et al. Report on Explainability in Machine Reasoning
idea of an interactive proof system [92].
An interactive proof system models computation as the exchange of messages between two par-
ties: a prover and a verifier. The prover has vast computational resources, but cannot be trusted, while
the trusted verifier has bounded computation power. As the name suggests, the prover tries to prove
some statement to the verifier. Interactive proofs often proceed in “rounds”, where the parties send
messages to each other based on previous messages they have received, till the verifier is “convinced”
of the truth of the statement. One can also have one-round (often referred to as non-interactive) proofs
where the prover only needs to send one message to convince the verifier of a true statement, and no
further rounds of interaction are necessary.
Interactive proof systems have two requirements: soundness and completeness. Essentially, sound-
ness claims that no prover – even a dishonest one – can convince the verifier of a false statement.
Completeness says that for every true statement, there is a proof that the prover can produce to the
verifier to convince it. The verifier may choose to “probe” various parts of the proof sent by the
prover to convince itself of the verity of the statement. This is often done in an efficient manner by
picking random bits and using them to identify which parts of the proof to inspect. Depending on
what the abilities of the prover and the verifier are, one can get different classes of proofs. One can
get (slightly) different systems based on whether the random values chosen by the verifier are made
public or kept private. If one assumes the existence of special objects like one-way functions, one can
construct “zero-knowledge proofs”, where the verifier is convinced exactly of the intended statement,
but no further information about said statement is revealed. One can also have systems where multiple
provers can interact with the verifier (but not with each other) to prove a statement.
Interactive proof systems can be seen as an excellent example of AI-to-AI explainability ap-
proaches that have existed for a long time. However, as previously noted, there are still plenty of
interesting open problems in this area.
3.1.5 Abduction
Abductive reasoning, e.g. [113, 118, 133], aims at explaining phenomena such as observations, ab-
normalities, anomalies, false predictions. The notion of an explanation follows closely that of ex-
planations in classical logic-based reasoning delineated above, but in addition allows for inventing,
i.e. abducing, additional knowledge. This abduced knowledge, possibly together with existing back-
ground knowledge, is seen as an explanation in that it allows to deduce a given phenomenon. Minimal
(in various forms) sets of abducibles as explanations can be used for explaining abductive reasoning
via causal knowledge graphs [200], or, as in e.g. [15, 107], for explaining ML model classifications by
logically encoding ML models and abducing minimal assignments representing feature attributions
that guarantee classifications.
Explanations via abducibles aim at answering the following kinds of questions.
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• What information would entail this observation? [118]
• Why was the wrong belief or expectation formed? [133]
Abducibles as explanations are thus largely attributive: given background knowledge KB and a
(possibly hypothetical) inference o, the abducible knowledge ab is an explanation for o just in case
KB ∪ {ab} |= o. However, hints of contrastive and actionable explanations appear in abducibles
in that they indicate knowledge that, if present, would allow to achieve a hypothetical/alternative
outcome/inference.
3.2 Non-classical Logic-Based Reasoning (Logic Programming)
Logic Programming (LP, see e.g. [11, 119]) is both a knowledge representation formalism and com-
putational mechanism for non-classical, particularly non-monotonic, reasoning. Often, explainability
in LP is enabled by the declarative reading of rules in logic programs, which allows for attributive
explanations in terms of knowledge and rules that yield a specific inference. Further, if the knowledge
and rules carry immediate semantic meaning, then deductive inference paths or proof trees are read-
ily interpretable and can be translated into natural language, as e.g. in Rulelog [94, 95]. Still further,
contrastive explanations can be obtained by inspecting conflict resolution strategies.
In general, LP takes various forms, most notably abductive, inductive and answer set program-
ming, each with different computational procedures and different approaches to explainability. We
discuss some of these below.
3.2.1 Abductive Logic Programming (ALP)
Abductive Logic Programming (ALP) [71, 113] is a form of abductive reasoning expressed using
LP vocabulary. Abductive logic programs are used for knowledge representation and abductive proof
procedures for automated reasoning. Abductive proof procedures interleave backward and forward
reasoning and can be used for checking and enforcing properties of knowledge representation (via
queries or inputs to the program) as well as for agents to abduce and/or explain actions required to
check/enforce such properties.
Formally, given an abductive logic program P , an abductive explanation for an observation o
(conjunctive formula) is a pair (D, θ) consisting of a (possibly empty) set D of abducibles and a
(possibly empty) variable substitution θ for the variables in o such that P together with abducibles
D entail oθ and satisfy integrity constraints. Different notions of entailment and satisfaction can be
adopted, for example classical first-order entailment P ∪D |= oθ and consistency P ∪D 6` ⊥.
Intuitively, abductive explanations answer the following questions [113, 199]:
• Why did this observation occur?
• What explains this observation?
• How to reach this goal/query?
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Accordingly, as in Section 3.1.5 Abduction, abductive explanations in ALP are attributive, with
flavors of actionability: “explanations can be thought of as data to be actually added to the beliefs
of the agents and actions that, if successfully performed by the agents, would allow for the agents to
achieve the given objectives while taking into account the agents’ beliefs, prohibitions, obligations,
rules of behavior and so on, in the circumstances given by the current inputs.”[199, p. 100]
3.2.2 Inductive Logic Programming (ILP)
Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) [153] studies the inductive construction of logic programs from
examples and background knowledge. Briefly, “given a set of positive examples, and a set of negative
examples, an ILP system constructs a logic program that entails all the positive examples but does
not entail any of the negative examples.”[72, p. 1] The set of induced rules, called hypotheses, pos-
sibly together with a proof trace, is viewed as an explanation of the examples in the context of the
background knowledge: given background knowledge KB and sets P and N of positive and negative
examples, respectively, a set R of clauses (i.e. hypotheses) is an explanation for given examples just
in case KB ∪ R ` p for all p ∈ P and KB ∪ R 6` n for all n ∈ N . Hypotheses as explanations thus
aim to answer the following question:
• What general hypothesis best explains the given specific examples/observations?
As such, explanations in ILP are closely related to explanations in ALP. The two LP techniques
can indeed be considered complementary [153], noting that “abduction is the process of explanation
– reasoning from effects to possible causes, whereas induction is the process of generalization –
reasoning from specific cases to general hypothesis.”[132, p. 205] Some recent works, e.g. [72, 145],
use integrated ILP and ML techniques to learn explanatory logic programs from non-symbolic data.
Overall, ILP explanations as hypotheses or proof paths are attributive in nature.
3.2.3 Answer Set Programming (ASP)
Fandinno and Schulz provide an excellent overview in [78] of explanations in Answer Set Program-
ming (ASP) [30, 136], which have been researched for some 25 years. There are two main families
of approaches, namely justification and debugging. The respectively aim at answering these kind of
questions:
• Why is a literal (not) contained in an answer set?
• Why is an unexpected or no answer set computed?
Both families first-and-foremost provide attributive explanations, albeit with different flavors: justi-
fications can be inspired by, for instance, causal or argumentative reasoning; debugging can be based,
for instance, on reporting unsatisfied rules or unsatisfiable cores. Both justification and debugging
approaches may also supply contrastive explanations by including conflicting information and re-
vealing conflict resolution that takes place in reasoning. We briefly summarize the main ideas below,
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following [78].
Justification approaches by and large concern consistent logic programs and provide “somewhat
minimal explanation as to why a literal in question belongs to an answer set”. Off-line justifications
[166] are graph structures describing the derivations of atoms’ truth values via program rules and can
be seen to provide traces of dependencies. Labelled Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA)-based
answer set justifications (LABAS) [180, 181] abstract away from intermediate rule applications and
focus on the literals occurring in rules used in the derivation and can be seen to provide traces via
(supporting and attacking) arguments (see Argumentation), thus exhibiting reasons pro and con the
inference in question.
In a similar vain, causal graph justifications [34] associate with each literal a set of causal justifi-
cations that can be graphically depicted and can be seen as causal chain traces. Causal graph justifi-
cations are inspired by why-not provenance [202], which itself provides non-graphical justifications
expressing modifications to the program that can change the truth value of the atom in question. (By
extension, justifications for the actual truth values do not imply any modifications.) These can be seen
to approach the realm of actionable explanations, though unlike causal graph justifications, why-not
provenance does not discriminate between productive causes and other counterfactual dependencies
(see e.g. [98, 99]).
Debugging approaches instead by and large concern inconsistent logic programs and provide ex-
planations as to why a set of literals is not an answer set. The spock system [28, 87] transforms a logic
program into a meta-(logic)program expressing conditions for e.g. rule applicability and whose an-
swer sets capture violations of the given candidate answer set of the original program in terms of rule
satisfaction, unsupported atoms or unfounded loops. The Ouroboros system [161] extends these ideas
to logic programs possibly with variables, tackling also the issue of multiple explanations by requiring
the user to specify an intended answer set. Instead, [64, 184] propose interactive debugging whereby
the user is queried for about specific atoms to produce the relevant explanations of inconsistencies.
The above summary shows the wealth of explainability techniques in ASP, but there are also works
that use ASP for explanations in other areas. For instance, in [35] Calegari et al. map decision trees
(DTs) into logic programs to explain DT predictions via natural language explanations generated from
logic program rules.
In another recent research direction [15], Bertossi uses ASP to generate contrastive explanations
for discrete, structured data classification. Briefly, there: a) causal explanations are sets of feature–
value pairs such that changing at least one value changes the classification label; b) counterfactual
(value-)explanations are individual feature-value pairs such that changing the value changes the clas-
sification; c) actual (value-)explanations are individual feature-value pairs together with a set of fea-
ture-value pairs such that changing the value of the former does not suffice to change the classification,
but changing the values of both the former and the latter does. Actual and counterfactual explanations
can be assigned explanatory responsibility measure, which amounts to the inverted size of the small-
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est set accompanying an actual explanation, with the explanatory responsibility of a counterfactual
explanation always being 1 (because it suffices to flip only that feature-value to change the classi-
fication). Overall, Bertossi proposes to encode the inputs-outputs of an ML classifier into an ASP
program, together with predicates and constraints capturing interventions (i.e. feature-value flipping)
to extract the various explanations defined by computing answer sets.
3.3 Argumentation
“Computational Argumentation is a logical model of reasoning that has its origins in philosophy
and provides a means for organizing evidence for (or against) particular claims (or decisions).”[186,
p. 277] Moulin et al. review in [151] a large body of literature on MR explainability and argue for the
use of argumentation to support interactive and collaborative explanations of reasoning that take into
account the aspects of justification as well as criticism of claims/decisions/solutions. Indeed, “[t]here
is a natural pairing between Explainable AI and Argumentation: the first requires the need to ex-
plain decisions and the second provides a method for linking any decision to the evidence supporting
it.”[186, p. 277]
By and large, data and knowledge in argumentation formalisms can be represented using various
forms of directed graphs, whereby nodes represent arguments modelling individual pieces of infor-
mation and edges represent relationships among arguments (e.g. attacks for conflicting information,
supports for supporting information). Reasoning then amounts to find the sets of “good” arguments,
for instance arguments acceptable under some semantics, i.e. a collection of formal criteria such as
not attacking each other and defending against all attackers. (See Figure 1 (i).)
A common approach to explaining decisions in argumentation, one which encompasses both jus-
tification and criticism, essentially amounts to traversing (a part of) an argument graph to show the
attacking and defending arguments (together with their relationships) relevant to the decision, where
the decision essentially amounts to accepting (resp. rejecting) an argument as (resp. not) “good”. In
addition, one can speculate what kind of changes to the argument graph, such as additions or removals
of arguments or relationships, would result into different acceptance status(es) of the argument(s) in
question. Argumentative explanations thus aim to answer the following questions:
• Given a set of arguments, why is a particular argument a “good”? [76]
• What are the reasons (i.e. other arguments) for and against accepting a?
• Can the given reasons for acceptance of a be contested?
• Which arguments/relationships should be removed or added to accept argument a? [77, 179]
Intuitively, to explain acceptability of an argument x, “one would need to show how to defend x by
showing that for every argument y that is put forward (moved) as an attacker of x, one must move
an argument z that attacks y, and then subsequently show how any such z can be reinstated against
attacks (in the same way that z reinstates x). The arguments moved can thus be organised into a graph
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Figure 1: Adapted from [147, Fig. 6.3, p. 114]. (i) An AA graph with nodes as arguments, labelled
a, b, c, d, e, and directed edges as attacks. Arguments accepted (resp. rejected) under the grounded ex-
tension semantics [66] are colored green (resp. red). (ii) Grounded dispute tree between the proponent
P and opponent O, for the topic argument a. The proponent can successfully defend the claimed ar-
gument a against all the counterarguments. (iii) A dialogue explanation as to why a is accepted, to be
read thus: “a is objected only by b, but is in turn defended by c; c is objected only by d, but is defended
by the unobjectionable e”. The explanation reveals all the pros and cons relevant for acceptance of a.
of attacking arguments that constitutes an explanation as to why x is [acceptable]”[148, p. 109].
So, given a graph G representing an argumentation framework and a query regarding a statement
(e.g. (the claim of) an argument) i, an explanation for the acceptance status o of i is a minimal (in
some sense) subgraph G′ ⊆ G consisting of arguments for and counterarguments against o that (fully
or partially) determine o. The subgraph G′ can be turned into a formal dispute tree [67, 148] where
two fictional players – proponent P and opponent O – put forward arguments in favor (pro) and
against (con) a topic argument, see Figure 1 (ii). This can accompanied by dialogical explanation to
the effect of establishing o by using the arguments for (pros) to defend from the counterarguments
(cons), see Figure 1 (iii). Such explanations are contrastive and answer the first two questions above.
Relatedly, an explanation can be a modification G′ of the original argument graph G such that the
desired acceptance status o of i is achieved. Such explanations can be seen as actionable and answer
the last two questions above.
In practice, constructing argumentative explanations amounts to one or both of the following two
phases.
• Extract a connected subgraph (e.g. a path, branch, cycle; possibly depth-, width- or otherwise
bounded) that consists of the relevant arguments and counterarguments together with their ac-
ceptability statuses, and potentially indicate arguments and/or relationships that if added and/or
removed would change the acceptability statuses. Examples include [58, 59, 75, 77, 115, 172,
180, 181, 183, 210, 212].
• Construct a formal dialogue [168] or an argument game [143, 148] in “which participants
engage in structured, rule-guided, goal-oriented exchange [of arguments] according to spe-
cific protocols.”[186, p. 208] Such dialogue games underly argumentation-supported dialogi-
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cal/conversational explanations [141, 186, 205, 206]. The “winning” arguments are determined
by argumentation semantics, so such dialogue games show how one player justifies the decision
while the other criticizes it. Examples include [12, 50, 51, 55, 57, 67, 74, 76, 77, 148, 181].
These ideas are not limited to various argumentation formalisms. On the one hand, they can be
directly applied to reasoning formalisms that can be captured or reinterpreted in argumentative terms:
1. In [24] Booth et al. construct explanatory dialogues for logic programs using abstract argumen-
tation (AA, [66]).
2. In [180, 181] Schulz and Toni use correspondence between answer sets in Answer Set Pro-
gramming (ASP) and stable extensions in Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA, [23, 56])
to explain why a literal is or is not contained in an answer set of a logic program. The idea
behind an explanation, or rather a justification, “for a literal l is to find the underlying literals,
necessary to derive l, as well as conflicts with other literals which influence whether or not l is
part of an answer set.”[180, p. 3]
3. In [86] Garcı´a and Simari define argumentative dialogical explanations for queries in Defeasible
Logic Programming (DeLP).
4. In [213] Zhong et al. map decision frameworks into ABA frameworks so that best decisions
in the former correspond to acceptable arguments in the latter, and use ABA dispute trees as
explanations.
5. In [74] Fan captures planning problems in ABA and extracts explanations pertaining to actions
and/or their preconditions and goals relevant to the (in)validity of a plan.
On the other hand, ideas based on argumentative and dialogical explanations can be applied to
explain reasoning in other fields:
6. In [183] Sˇesˇelja and Straßer extend AA frameworks with explanatory and incompatibility rela-
tions to define explanations as explanatory paths in conflict- and incompatibility-free preferred
extensions, applying this to scientific debates.
7. In [31] Briguez et al. propose an argumentation-supported recommender system using DeLP,
which allows to naturally extract explanations in terms of reasons for and against a recom-
mendation. Similarly, in [50, 172] the authors propose and evaluate empirically a gradual
argumentation-based recommender system where items and their aspects are captured via argu-
ments, gradual semantics is used to determine the recommendations and explanations amount
to argument subgraphs that are turned into natural language explanations.
8. In [12, 101] the authors use variants of dispute trees and argumentation dialogues for explaining
answers to queries in ontology-based knowledge bases.
9. In [197] Timmer et al. extract probabilistically supported arguments from a Bayesian network
to construct a support graph and, given a set of observations, build arguments from that support
graph. Such arguments can facilitate the correct interpretation and explanation of the evidence
modelled in Bayesian networks.
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10. In [186] Sklar and Azhar illustrate argumentative natural language explanations arising from
argumentation dialogue games in a collaborative human-autonomous agent scenario.
11. In [49] Cocarascu et al. use machine learning (autoencoders) to populate case-based reasoning
(CBR)-inspired argumentation frameworks for data classification/prediction. There, explana-
tions can be extracted in two equivalent ways: dialectical explanations as subgraphs with argu-
ments comprising relevant data instances with known labels that support and/or contrast with
the prediction; rule-based explanations as logic programming (LP) rules (with exceptions) com-
prised of features. Cocarascu et al. further such dialectical explanations in [51] to classification
of categorical data, annotated images and text.
12. In [182] Sendi et al. extract probabilistic classification rules from deep neural networks which
then constitute arguments explaining any given classification.
13. In [57] Cˇyras et al. use CBR-inspired, AA-driven reasoning formalism to classify and explain
legislative data.
14. In [58] Cˇyras et al. use AA frameworks to capture schedules and their properties for defining,
extracting and presenting [59] explanations in makespan scheduling.
Other forms of argumentation-enabled explainable reasoning have been proposed too: (i) In [52]
Collins et al. propose structured argumentation as a good candidate for representing causality and
forming as well as communicating explanations in the planning domain; (ii) in [173] Raymond et al.
propose an argumentation-based architecture for designing explainable human-agent systems for de-
confliction environments.
3.4 Decision Theory
Decision theory gathers different domains such as Multi-Criteria Decision Making, Decision Making
under Uncertainty and Computational Social Choice (SC). “The typical decision problem studied in
decision theory consists in selecting one alternative among a set X of candidate options, where the
alternatives are described by several dimensions. This selection is obtained by the construction of a
preference relation over X .”[125, p. 1411] The final part of the decision process, i.e. explaining the
outcome of the decision model to the user, is by and large not readily supported by decision theory
models due to their complexity. It is nonetheless arguably as important as the recommendation of the
outcome itself (see e.g. [14, p. 152]) and attempts at answering the following kind of question (see
e.g. [22, 125]):
• Can this recommendation (i.e. the chosen alternative) be justified under the given preference
profile?
Explainability in decision theory has been researched in modern MR. On the one hand, forms
of Argumentation have been proposed for explainable decision making, see e.g. [5, 6, 212, 213].
Specifically, in [5, 6] the authors propose to use abstract argumentation with preferences for multiple
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agents to argue about acceptable decisions. There, explainability is assumed to arise naturally from the
argumentative process, but is not specified at all. Instead, Zhong et al. map decision frameworks into
Assumption-Based Argumentation and use dispute trees (see Section 3.3) to generate explanations
as to why a decision is best, better than or as good as others. They also translate such contrastive
dialogical explanations into natural language and perform an empirical user study in a legal reasoning
setting to evaluate their approach. These works effectively define argumentation-supported decision
making procedures where explainability arises from the argumentative methods employed.
On the other hand, Labreuche in [125] provides solid theoretical foundations to produce expla-
nations for a range of decision-theoretic models via provision of arguments, but not using formal
argumentation. There, arguments, and therefore explanations, essentially are “based on the identifica-
tion of the decisive criteria.”[125, p. 1415] They are thus attributive, supplying justifications in terms
of higher-level criteria that support the recommended decision.
Similar in spirit, Labreuche, Maudet, and Ouerdane in [127] consider the setting of qualitative
multi-criteria decision making with preferential information regarding the importance of the criteria
and preference rankings over different options (choices). They define explanations as collections of
factored preference statements (roughly of the form ‘on criteria I , option o is better than options P ’)
that justify the choice of the weighted Condorcet winner. Such explanations pertain to the relevant
data (problem inputs) supporting a proof that the recommended decision/choice is the best one.
Some more recent works essentially apply to various settings the same conceptual idea that expla-
nations of decisions made pertain to important criteria or principles based on which the model makes
a decision. For instance, in [159] explaining amounts to identification of decisive criteria as sets of
attributes that are most important for preferring one option over another. Nunes et al. thus propose
attributive explanations via several decision criteria in a quantitative multi-attribute decision making
setting. Belahcene et al. deal with incomplete preference specifications in [14] and thereby use prefer-
ence swaps to explain/justify decisions. Intuitively, their explanations transform a complex preference
statement (over many attributes) that needs to be understood by the user into a series of simpler pref-
erence statements (over few attributes). In [126], Labreuche and Fossier consider hierarchical models
of multi-criteria decision aiding. They use Shapley values to define axiomatic indices regarding the
influence of different criteria and provide attributive explanations pertaining to the importance of dif-
ferent criteria. In a setting where different audiences may adhere to different norms [22], Boixel and
Endriss explain the decision making outcome by presenting axioms (with respect to audience’s norms)
for which no voting rule would yield a different outcome. We deem such explanations pertaining to
the importance of decision-making criteria to be attributive.
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3.5 Planning
Automated planning (or AI planning) is a class of decision making techniques that deals with com-
puting sequences of actions towards achieving a goal. The solution to a planning problem is found by
a planner, typically one based on heuristic search. Chakraborti et al. review in [44] the most recent
advances in explainable AI planning. They emphasize the importance of user modelling, or “persona”
of the explainee. Although their classification is broad – in terms of end-user, algorithm designer and
model designer personas – it is clear that more granular models are possible. Their work reinforces
Miller’s view on the characteristics of effective explanations [144], namely that explanations should
be “social in being able to model the expectations of the explainee, selective in being able to select
explanations among several competing hypothesis, and contrastive in being able to differentiate prop-
erties of two competing hypothesis.”[44, p. 4805] Further, Chakraborti et al. also point to the use of
abstractions as a means to provide effective explanations. They go on to provide a useful categoriza-
tion of recent approaches to explanations in AI planning, based on whether explanations reveal the
working of an algorithm, details of the underlying model, or attempt to reconcile the differences be-
tween the user and system’s mental models. The kinds of questions that explanations in planning aim
to answer pertain to goodness of plans, alternative choices and unsolvability, and are as follows:
• What changes (in the current state) would make this solvable? (I.e. making excuses.) [91]
• What are possible reasons you could not compute a plan from your current state to the given
goal state? [91]
• Why a plan fails to be a solution, which actions are invalid? [74]
• Why fail and what (temporal) repercussions does the first failure have? [201]
• Why did the agent take action A (at that time) rather than action B (resp. earlier or later)? [38]
• Why was a particular predicate (agent/object) involved in the plan? [38]
• How good is a given plan from the point of view of the human observer (their computational
model)? [42]
To answer questions about unsolvability and failures, some approaches provide contrastive ex-
planations in terms of a part KB ′ of the model KB that together with the initial state i and the
desired goal(s) o lead to unsolvability ⊥. For instance, Fan in [74] captures STRIP-like planning in
Assumption-Based Argumentation and extracts explanations pertaining to actions and/or their pre-
conditions and goals relevant to both validity and invalidity of a plan. The unsolvability of planning
tasks can also be explained to the user by pointing out unreachable but necessary goals in terms of
propositional fluents, assuming appropriate abstractions of the user’s model of the problem, e.g. [193].
Similarly, pointing out actions executed in a faulty node and their propagations (subsequent failed ac-
tions and their relationships) can be used to define explanations in temporal multi-agent planning
[201]. Such explanations mostly work by attributing counterexamples to solvability in the current
system S. However, counterfactual contrastive explanations in terms of excuses – minimal, restrictive
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changes to the initial state i that would allow to reach the desired goal o – are also possible [91].
Regarding alternative courses of action, contrastive explanations can be supplied that pertain to
higher-level properties satisfied or not by the (current or alternative) plan. The general idea in answer-
ing questions about a given plan pi not satisfying some property p is to produce a new plan pi′ that does
satisfy p and compare the two plans [69]. For instance, in [68] Eifler et al. develop a means to qualify
how good or poor a plan is, beyond the obvious properties such as cost or plan length. Such plan-
property dependencies allow oversubscribed goals to be reasoned over, and explained by an agent.
Specifically, in [69] Eifler et al. define explanations via plan-property entailment of soft goals so that
an answer to the question “why is a property (set of soft goals) not achieved?” amounts to exhibiting
other properties (sets of soft goals) that would not be achieved otherwise. In the specific case of goal
exclusions, explanations amount to ⊆-minimal unsolvable goal subsets. [70] is an extension of this
approach to plan properties formulated in Linear Temporal Logic (LTL).
Another prominent challenge in explaining planning that has recently attracted a fair amount of
research interest is that of model reconciliation [40, 41, 42, 43, 124], aiming to answer the last question
above. Here the assumption is that humans have a domain and task model that differs significantly
from that used by the AI agent, and explanations suggest changes to the human’s model to reconcile
the differences between the two. The objective of model reconciliation is not to completely balance
the information asymmetry, but is selective to knowledge updates that can minimally cause human-
computed plans to match those computed by the system. Such explanations are contrastive too [44],
in that they contrast the models of the AI system and its user and aim to bring modification to the latter
so as to convince the user of the goodness of the plan. Relatedly but orthogonally, Krarup et al. show
in [120] how user constraints can instead be added to the formal planning model so that contrastive
explanations as differences between the solutions to the initial and the new model can be extracted.
We note that model reconciliation is in some aspects closely related to plan/goal recognition [36].
Essentially, recognizing the AI agent’s goals may be seen as a prerequisite to providing rationale for
its behavior. And the other way round, recognizing the user’s plans and goals can serve as a means to
improve explanations.
3.6 Multi-Agent Systems
Explainability in AI-supported Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) (sometimes also called Distributed AI
[134]) concerns interactions among multiple intelligent agents so as to agree on and explain individual
actions/decisions. Roughly, the questions of interest can be posed as follows:
• How were the user’s (and the interacting agents’) preferences taken into account when making
a decision?
• What is the user’s satisfaction with the decision?
There are a few works in MR, specifically in Argumentation (see Section 3.3), that aim to address
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at least the first question above. On the one hand, in [5, 6] the authors propose to use abstract argu-
mentation with preferences for multiple agents to argue about acceptable decisions. Explainability is
assumed to arise naturally from the argumentative process, via relationships among arguments, given
preferences and argumentation semantics. On the other hand, Raymond et al. propose in [173] an
argumentation-based architecture for designing explainable human-agent systems for deconfliction
environments. There, agents exchange conflict-free sets of arguments/rules in a dialogue D and an
explanation of some topic argument a is a set S of related-admissible arguments [76] that recursively
defend a. The approach focuses “on generating post-hoc explanations derived from the history of a
dialogue D”. These are examples of contrastive argumentative explanations in MAS settings.
However, more generally and with respect to the user’s satisfaction, Kraus et al. stipulate in [121]
that there has so far been little explainability in multi-agent environments. They claim explainability
in MAS is more challenging than in other settings because “in addition to identifying the technical
reasons that led to the decision, there is a need to convey the preferences of the agents that were
involved.” Murukannaiah, Ajmeri, Jonker, and Singh echo this concern in [154] from the points-of-
view of multi-agent ethics, fairness etc. Several recent works suggest ways to address the challenges.
At a high-level, in [46] Ciatto et al. propose to integrate symbolic and connectionist approaches via
a multi-agent system to achieve explainability. More specifically, Kraus et al. propose to use ML
for generating “personalized explanations that will maximize user satisfaction”, which necessitates
collecting “data about human satisfaction from decision-making when various types of explanations
are given in different contexts.”[121, pp. 13534-13535] Along similar lines, in [8] Amir et al. suggest
research directions for agent strategy summarization to complement explainability in MAS. It remains
to be seen what lines of research will be instigated by these recent calls to renew interest in MAS
explainability, and whether MR, for instance the argumentation-based approaches discussed above,
will play a significant role.
3.7 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently become visible as a promising solution for dealing with
the general problem of optimal decision and control of agents that interact with uncertain environ-
ments. Application areas range from telecommunication systems, traffic control, autonomous driving,
robotics, economics and games. In the general setting, an RL agent is usually operating in an environ-
ment repetitively applying one of the possible available actions and receives a state observation and
a reward as feedback. The goal of the RL framework is to maximize the overall utility over a time
horizon. The choices of right actions are critical; while some actions exploit the existing knowledge,
some actions explore to how to increase the collected reward in future, at the cost of performing a
locally sub-optimal behavior.
Explaining control decisions produced by RL algorithms is crucial [2], since the rationale is often
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obfuscated, and the outcome is difficult to trust for two reasons: 1. lack of coverage in the exploration,
and 2. generalizability of the learned policies. Explainability in RL is complicated due to its real-time
nature, since control strategies develop over time, and are typically not evaluated over snapshots.
Several techniques for explanations are proposed in [2] such as Bayesian rule lists, function analysis,
Grammar-based decision trees, sensitivity analysis combined with temporal modeling using long-
short term memory networks, and explanation templates. Albeit such techniques are relevant as early
attempts towards explaining RL decisions, we do not review them in this paper since we do not think
they fall within MR. Instead we next briefly discuss some approaches that use symbolic techniques
for explainability in RL.
Approaches in the literature that integrate the RL framework with explanations have been investi-
gated in [84, 112, 117]. In particular, the authors in [84] introduce a framework of instructions-based
behavior explanation in order to explain the future actions of RL agents. In this way, the agent can
reuse the instructions from the human which leads to faster convergence. In [112], the method of
reward decomposition is proposed in order to explain the actions taken by an RL agent. The idea is to
split the reward in semantically meaningful types such that such that the action of the RL agent can be
compared with reference to trade-offs between the rewards. The study in [117] deals with the general
framework of explaining the policies over Markov Decision Policies (MDP). Under the assumption
that the MDP is factored, a subset a minimum set of explanations that justify the actions of MDP is
proposed. We believe these type of justifying explanations are a form of attributive explanations.
There is recent work on contrastive explanations in RL too. Specifically, in [142] Madumal et al.
define causal and counterfactual explanations for MDP-based RL agents given their action influence
models (which extend structural causal models [163] with actions). Specifically, they define a (com-
plete) causal explanation for an action A “as the complete causal chain from A to any future reward
that it can receive”, with a minimal such explanation omitting intermediate nodes in such a chain,
leaving source and destination nodes only. Further, they define a (minimally complete) explanation as
the difference between the actual causal chain for the taken action A, and the counterfactual causal
chain for some other action B. They show experimentally with human users that their explanations
are subjectively good enough and help the users to better understand the RL agent’s actions. However,
the method requires a correct model of the world to be given upfront.
3.7.1 Constrained RL
State-of-the-art RL is associated with several challenges: guaranteed safety during exploration in
the real world is one of them, and intricacy of reward construction is another. Many recent works
introduced preliminary results on mitigating these challenges through formal methods [4, 108, 109,
135]. The most related ones to MR focus on shielding or constraining exploration in general or in
various specific contexts, presenting objectives in the form of a linear temporal logic (LTL) formula
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[4, 109]. Recent works also include the design of control policies using RL methods to find policies
which guarantee the satisfaction of properties described in temporal logic [26, 108, 135].
3.7.2 Multi-Agent RL (MARL)
When it comes to Multi-Agent RL (MARL) frameworks, the main challenge to be addressed is the
dependency between the action and rewards of different agents in the environment [131, 211]. It is
natural when two or more agents are trying to optimize their local behavior over a horizon of time,
and conflicts might occur with respect to the team or global behavior of the agents. In such a setting,
different local optimal actions might lead to conflicting collaborative behavior. Thus, such scenarios
render the collaborative reward design challenging, and new algorithms should be designed in order
to address such problems. The MARL scenario imposes additional constraints and an efficient way
to handle them is to use a symbolic framework by presenting the constraints in a more convenient
ways, such as logical description. Kazhdan, Shams, and Lio` in [116] provide such model extraction
techniques that enhance explainability of MARL frameworks.
3.8 Causal Approaches
Causal models (see e.g. [88, 128, 163]) are useful in guiding interventional decisions and analyzing
counterfactual hypothetical situations. Using causal models one can not only provide a decision but
also provide a basis for what-if analysis, thus providing explanations. Lacave and Dı´ez provide in
[128] a summary of the work done on explaining AI models where the models are causal, quite often
Bayesian networks. The authors distinguish three classes of explanations. 1. Explanation of evidence
– this is basically abduction where the explanation is finding most probably explanations of variables
not directly observable, based on the observed evidence variables. This can be seen as a form of
attributive explanations. 2. Explanation of the model – this is simply a description (graphically or
in text) the causal model. 3. Explanation of reasoning – here the objective is to explain the reasoning
process for the result obtained, for specific results not obtained, or for counterfactual reasoning. We
see these largely as contrastive explanations.
As regards the first class, [88] can be seen as an early example. There, Geffner equates “being
caused” with “being explained”. In contrast to earlier explanation techniques that used logical deriva-
tions (roughly as antecedents of rules that explain the consequents), Geffner augments default theories
[174] with a causality/explanations operator C which is used to define an order over classes of mod-
els of default theories in terms of explained abnormalities (ab predicates). The kind of rule-based
attributive explanations therefore have an abductive flavor. [156] is instead a modern MR example
to explaining causality. Nielsen et al. show that given a set of variables, the values of which an ex-
planation is sought after, it is possible to determine a set of other variables (explanatory variables)
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which probabilistically explain the given set of observed variables. Some of these are possibly ob-
served while the others are not. Indeed this includes abducing some variables from others. The use
of a causal Bayesian network to trace these other variables is particularly interesting in the case of
causal explanations.
Nielsen et al. further show how to use the interventional distribution on a Causal Bayesian network
to compute a causal explanation, thus approaching the realm of contrastive explanations. Another
recent example of attributive explanations with a counterfactual flavor is the work of [142] which
uses structural causal models to explain actions of RL agents. In principle, to support counterfactual
reasoning and thus contrastive explanations, one can use pure regression techniques factoring in time
to do some causal correlation For instance, in Granger-causal inferencing the idea is to use time
series data analysis and hypothesis testing to extract possible causal influences. However, much more
informative models are structural equation models (see e.g. [163]) and causal Bayesian networks (see
e.g. [103]).
Structural equation models allow specification of equations that denote the effect of one variable
on the other. That is most helpful in doing interventional analysis. The model also supports a logic
with an algebra that allows counterfactual analysis. On the other hand, Bayesian networks allow
for probabilistic relations between variables and thus also enable interventional and counterfactual
analysis. The Structural Causal Model is possibly the most evolved and combines the benefits of both
these models. The rich set of analytical tools that it comes with is described in [163].
Generally, Pearl argues in [163] that explainability and other obstacles “can be overcome using
causal modeling tools, in particular, causal diagrams and their associated logic.” Methods for creating
such causal models are therefore of great importance. The main challenge of these methods in prac-
tice, however, is learning the model from data. Very often expert input is used in conjunction with data
to build the models. Heckerman describes in [102] how it is possible to build Causal Bayesian Net-
works from data, under some assumptions. Causal Bayesian Networks can be extended to Bayesian
Decision Networks where the decision variables and the utility (optimization) variables are explicitly
identified and used for decision making. See e.g. [53] for a concise introduction to the area.
Overall, we contend that despite the progress with techniques for causality, we are still far from
formalizing and being able to explain other more nuanced interpretations of causality that humans are
familiar with. This is exemplified by the works on ‘actual’ causality, e.g. [63], which illustrates with
simple examples the challenges or explainability using simple causal diagrams.
4 Remarks
We briefly discuss a few aspects related to our categorization of explanations (Section 2.3) and its
relationship to MR approaches overviewed in this report.
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Causality We have discussed Causal Approaches loosely as a branch of MR where explainability
is investigated. Instead, causality can be viewed as a property or even constitute a category of expla-
nations, see e.g. [110]. However, following e.g. [144, 189, 207], we contend that explanations may,
but need not in general be causal. It is for instance acknowledged that “it does not seem possible to
develop a formal connection between counterfactuals and causality.”[90, p. 69] We thus maintain that
the aspect of causality is orthogonal to our categorization of explanations.
Hierarchy of explanation families We see the three categories of explanations forming a hierarchy
of increasing complexity in the following intuitive sense. Attributive explanations may act as compo-
nents of contrastive explanations (e.g. attributions pro and con), and contrastive explanations can pave
way for actionable explanations (e.g. contrasting outcomes lead to actions). This complexity also well
reflects the maturity of different types of explanations, with attributive ones being the oldest and most
pervasive, contrastive ones more recent and advanced, and actionable explanations arguably the most
challenging and least explored.
User-centrism In addition to the three families of explanations that we proposed, we recognize the
property of explanations being user-centric, see e.g. [40, 149, 150, 176, 207, 214]. While it clearly
applies to attributive, contrastive and actionable explanations, here we also have in mind a slightly
different, more general notion of user-centrism. Specifically, it pertains to approaches to explainability
directly taking into account the user (human or AI, indifferently) model, preferences, intentions etc. It
is not only about the explanations being e.g. accessible, comprehensible, informative, but also about
the relation between the explainee and the explanation. For instance, in the human user case,
1. an attributive explanation may need to take into account the relevance of the attributions to the
user, e.g. domain vs procedural knowledge in the inference from knowledge to outcome;
2. a contrastive explanation may need to take into account the context in terms of which counter-
factual situations are attainable to the user, e.g. the controllable aspects of the problem domain
such as resource availability;
3. an actionable explanation may need to take into account the user’s preferences over decisions,
e.g. costs of resources and actions.
User-centric explanations concern the system’s understanding of its user, and include aspects of
cooperation and adaptation. At a high level, they aim to answer the following question:
• Given a representation of the problem and of the user, e.g. their preferences or mental model,
and given an object of interest (e.g. a query, a decision, a solution, a change, a desideratum),
how are the user and the object related?
The challenges with attaining such explanations (and hence the current scarcity of them, at least in
MR) have been brought forward in e.g. [44, 121, 194]. We hope that the developing landscape of MR
explainability may soon allow (and require) an overview of the user-centric aspects of explanations.
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Explanation desiderata In addition to such overarching properties as user-centrism and the cat-
egories of explanations suggested herein, explanations in AI can be studied and classified in terms
of the desiderata (or desirable properties) they fulfil. To appreciate the evolution of desiderata for
AI explainability over the previous decades we invite the reader to consult the following works:
[96, 100, 110, 123, 128, 137, 138, 189, 204]. We agree that a discussion of the various desiderata
would be complementary to our overview, but it is beyond the scope of this work. We believe that our
categorization works at a sufficiently high-level and is adequate for the purposes of this report.
Applicability of categories We speculate that our loose categorization of explanations in AI applies
to ML as well as to MR. For instance, post-hoc ML explanation techniques summarized in [13, p. 89,
Figure 4], are attributive, except for local explanations, which can also be seen as contrastive. It is
reasonable to expect our categories to be applicable to other XAI approaches, given that our work
builds on and borrows from recent XAI overviews. However, we by no means claim that our loose
categorization is exhaustive: there may obviously be types of explanations that are not covered by our
three families, e.g. explanations by example that are rather popular in ML (see e.g. [149]). We leave
it for future work to see how broadly our categorization applies to non-MR approaches.
5 Conclusions
In this report, we have provided a high-level conceptual overview of selected Machine Reasoning
(MR) approaches to explainability. We have summarised what we believe are the most relevant MR
contributions to Explainable AI (XAI), from early to modern MR research, perhaps with a stronger
focus on the more recent studies. We have discussed explainability in MR branches of Classical
Logic-Based Reasoning, Non-classical Logic-Based Reasoning (Logic Programming), Argumenta-
tion, Decision Theory and Planning as well as the related areas of Multi-Agent Systems, Reinforce-
ment Learning and Causal Approaches. In particular, we have seen that MR explainability approaches
are suited not only for explainable MR (i.e. explaining MR-based AI systems) but also for explain-
ability in other fields or areas of AI, such Machine Learning (ML).
We have loosely categorized the various kinds of explanations provided by MR approaches into
three families of explanations: attributive, contrastive and actionable. Attributive explanations give
details as to why an AI system yields a particular output given a particular input in terms of attribution
and association of the (parts of the) system and the input with the output. These type of explanations
have been studied since the very early MR and continue to be relevant and widely used in modern
MR as well as its approaches to XAI at large. Contrastive explanations give details as to why an AI
system yields one but not another output given some input in terms of reasons for and against different
outputs. This type of explanations has been advocated for in MR for a long time too and appears in
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modern MR in the form of counterexamples, criticisms, counterfactuals and dialogues. Such and
similar forms of contrastive explanations are being actively explored in MR and its applications to
XAI. Finally, actionable explanations give details as to what can be done in order for an AI system
to yield a particular output given input in terms of actions available to the system’s user (human or
AI, indifferently). This kind of explanations should enable interventions to the system and eventually
an interactive collaboration between the user and the system so as to reach desirable outcomes. We
see actionable explanations as belonging to the frontier of MR explainability where novel research
approaches and directions are being proposed.
Our categorization of explanations is informed by the different types of questions about the AI
system’s workings which explanations seek to answer. We have indicated some of the questions ad-
dressed in the overviewed MR branches and summarized the higher-level questions. In answering the
latter, an explanation provides some details and reasons about the AI system and its functioning. This
pertains to what we believe are the main purposes of explanations in XAI, namely to enable the user
of an AI system to both understand the system and to do something with the explanation.
The main lesson in writing this report was perhaps the (re)discovery of the evolution of XAI
challenges and the wealth of MR approaches aiming to address those challenges. Importantly, we
want to stress that XAI research in MR is very much active to date, as seen from our overview
of modern MR explainability studies. Still, despite the advances over the years, challenges in MR
explainability abound and it seems that lessons from the past hold well today too [110, p. 161]:
If explanation provision is to become a characteristic feature of many future interfaces,
then there is a special responsibility for researchers in both HCI [human-computer inter-
action] and AI to provide input to the debate about the nature of the explanations to be
provided in future information systems. The onus on us as researchers in the area is to
ensure that we profit by past research on explanation provision, identify the strengths and
weaknesses in present research and build on the strengths and address the problems in
the future.
We hope that this report will inform the XAI community about the progress in MR explainability and
its overlap with other areas of AI, thus contributing to the bigger picture of XAI.
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